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Abstract— We study for the first time the verification problem
on learning-enabled state estimation systems for robotics, which
use Bayes filter for localisation, and use deep neural network
to process sensory input into observations for the Bayes filter.
Specifically, we are interested in a robustness property of the
systems: given a certain ability to an adversary for it to attack
the neural network without being noticed, whether or not the
state estimation system is able to function with only minor loss
of localisation precision? For verification purposes, we reduce
the state estimation systems to a novel class of labelled transition
systems with payoffs and partial order relations, and formally
express the robustness property as a constrained optimisation
objective. Based on this, practical verification algorithms are
developed. As a major case study, we work with a real-world
dynamic tracking system that uses a Kalman filter (a special
case of the Bayes filter) to localise and track a ground vehicle.
Its perception system, based on convolutional neural networks,
processes a high-resolution Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI)
data stream. Experimental results show that our algorithms can
not only verify the robustness of the WAMI tracking system
but also provide useful counterexamples.
I. INTRODUCTION
State estimation systems have been widely deployed for
many tasks within robotic applications, including localisation
[1], tracking [2], and control [3]. This paper considers neu-
ral network enabled state estimation systems where neural
networks are used to process perceptional input received
via sensors. More and more robotics applications adopt
neural network components to take advantage of their high
prediction precision [4].
However, the neural network has been found to be vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks, i.e., a small, imperceptible
perturbation on the input may alter the classification output.
The concern has been raised on how safe a learning enabled
system is when learning components interact with other
components (including Bayes filter components). In [5],
it has been found that the system is able to compensate
(to some degree) against adversarial attacks on its neural
network component, but there may also be new uncertainties
from the interactions between learning and non-learning
components. While some vulnerability cases were reported
in [5], there is no comprehensive study on all potential risks
in a learning enabled system, from the perspective of formal
verification. Formal verification can prove that a system is
correct against all possible risks over a specification and the
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formal model of the system, and returns counterexamples
when it cannot. The ability to sufficiently identify risks is
necessary for the deployment of safety critical applications –
this paper addresses this need. It is the first time a verification
approach has been developed for securing learning enabled
state estimation systems.
Technically, we first formalise a state estimation system
as a novel labelled transition system which has components
for payoffs and partial order relations. Specifically, every
transition is attached with a payoff, and for every state there
is a partial order relation between its out-going transitions
from the same state. Second, we show that the verification of
the robustness property on such a system can be reduced into
a constrained optimisation problem. Third, to enable practical
verification, we develop two algorithms: (1) a verification
algorithm – that can achieve complete results but cannot be
used for run-time – and (2) a heuristic algorithm – that can
be used efficiently in run-time, perform well in most cases,
but cannot provide a completeness guarantee.
As a major case study, we work with a real-world dynamic
tracking system [3], which detects and tracks ground vehicles
over the high-resolution Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI)
data stream, named WAMI tracking system in this paper. We
apply the developed algorithms to the WAMI tracking system
for safety analysis, in particular, we consider on a robustness
property that concerns whether the system can function well
under attack on the perceptional neural network components.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Neural Networks
Let X be the input domain and Y be the set of labels. A
neural network N : X → D(Y) can be seen as a function
mapping from X to probabilistic distributions over Y. That
is, N(x) is a probabilistic distribution, which assigns for
each label y ∈ Y a probability value (N(x))y . We let fN :
X → Y be a function such that for any x ∈ X, fN (x) =
arg maxy∈Y{(N(x))y}, i.e., fN (x) returns the classification.
B. Neural Network Enabled State Estimation
We consider a time-series linear state estimation problem
that is widely assumed in the context of object tracking. The
process model is defined as follow.
sk = F · sk−1 + ωk (1)
where sk is the state at time k, F is the transition matrix, ωk
is a zero-mean Gaussian noise such that ωk ∼ N (0,Q), with
Q being the covariance of the process noise. Usually, the
states are not observable and need to be determined indirectly
by measurement and reasoning. The measurement model is:
zk = H · sk + vk (2)
where zk is the observation, H is the measurement matrix,
vk is a zero-mean Gaussian noise such that vk ∼ N (0,R),
and R is the covariance of the measurement noise.
Bayes filters have been used for reasoning about the obser-
vations, {zk}, with the goal of learning the underlying states
{sk}. A Bayes filter maintains a pair of variables, (sk,Pk),
over the time, denoting Gaussian estimate and uncertainty,
respectively. The basic procedure of a Bayes filter is to use
a transition matrix, Fk, to predict the current state, (ŝk, P̂k),
given the previous state, (sk−1,Pk−1). The prediction state
can be updated into (sk,Pk) if a new observation, zk, is
obtained. In the context of the aforementioned problem, this
procedure is iterated for a number of time steps, and is
always discrete-time, linear, but subject to noises.
We take the Kalman Filter (KF), one of the most widely
used variants of Bayes filter, as an example to demonstrate
the above procedure. Let s0 ∈ Rn ∼ N (ŝ0, P̂0) be the initial
state, such that ŝ0 ∈ Rn and P̂0 ∈ Rn×n represent our
knowledge about the initial estimate and the corresponding
covariance matrix, respectively.






Then, we can update the filter:














Intuitively, yk is usually called “innovation” in signal
processing that represents the difference between the real
observation and the predicted observation, Sk is the covari-
ance matrix of this innovation, and Kk is the Kalman gain,
representing the relative importance of innovation yk with
respect to the predicted estimate ŝk.
In a neural network enabled state estimation, a perception
system – which may include multiple CNNs – will provide
a set of candidate observations Zk, any of which can be
chosen as the new observation zk. From the perspective of
robotics, Zk includes a set of possible states of the robot,
measured by (possibly several different) sensors at time k.
These measurements are imprecise, and are subject to noises
from both the environment (called epistemic uncertainty) and
the imprecision of sensors (aleatory uncertainty).
C. A Real-World WAMI Dynamic Tracking System
In this part, we have a brief introduction to the real-world
WAMI dynamic tracking system that will be used as our
major case study. The details of this system can be found in
[5] and [3]. The tracking system requires continuous imagery
input from e.g., airborne high-resolution cameras. The input
is a video, which consists of a finite sequence of WAMI
images. Each image contains a number of vehicles. The
processing chain of the WAMI tracking system is as follows.
1) Align a set of previous frames with the incoming one.
2) Construct the background model of incoming frames
using the median frame.
3) Extract moving objects using background subtraction.
4) Determine if the moving objects are vehicles by using
a Binary convolutional neural networks (CNN).
5) For complex cases, predict the locations of moving
objects/vehicles using a regression CNN.
6) Track one of the vehicles using a Kalman filter.
WAMI tracking uses Gated Nearest Neighbour (Gnn)
to choose the new observation zk: from the set Zk, the one
closest to the predicted measurement Hk · ŝk is chosen, i.e.,
zk = arg min
z∈Zk
||z−Hk · ŝk||p (6)
s.t. ||z−Hk · ŝk||p ≤ εk (7)
where ||·||p is for the Lp-norm distance (p=2, i.e., Euclidean
distance, is used in this paper), and εk is the gate value,
representing the maximum uncertainty the system is able to
work with.












where s contains the currently best estimates – or mean
values – of two variables l, representing the location, and
v, representing the velocity, respectively. Elements of P,
Σij , represent the degrees of correlation between variables
i, j ∈ {l, v}. The diagonal of P contains the mean square
error of the estimate s. The uncertainty – or Bayesian
uncertainty – ε is the trace of the covariance matrix:
ε = tr(P) = Σll + Σvv (9)
Intuitively, ε denotes a search range and only within this
range, observations are considered. Normally, ε will gradu-
ally shrink before being bounded – a convergence property
of the KF as explained below.
We remark that this WAMI dynamic tracking system mod-
els a Poisson-Bernoulli mixture process. The track initiali-
sation and the occurrence of false alarms follow a Poisson
distribution (since we are focusing on one single target, we
choose not to explicitly model this part) and the detectability
of the target follows a Bernoulli distribution which models
the CNN measurements (including mis-detections and spatial
errors). In this paper, KF is used to address the measurement
noise, but we note that it cannot be ensured that the Gaussian
noise is sufficient in this case. Therefore, the usage of
KF here is only under the assumption of Gaussian noises
whose parameters are empirically configured. It can be seen
as a smoothing algorithm rather than an optimal solution.
Nevertheless, investigating alternative likelihoods that more
faithfully represent the uncertainty and automated parameter
estimation for this problem is an intriguing future work.
Fig. 1: The workflow of attacking the WAMI system.
D. Expansion of Bayesian Uncertainty in Kalman Filters
Generally, a KF system works with the two phases,
prediction (3) and update (4), alternating. Theoretically, KFs
converge [6] under a good set of parameters F, H, Q, and
R. In this paper, we assume that the KF system has been
well designed to ensure the convergence. Empirically, this
has been proven possible in many practical systems. We are
interested in another property of KF, i.e., the uncertainty in
P̂k increases as opposed to Pk; if no update phase, i.e.,
Equation (4), is held, this predicted covariance P̂k will be
carried over to the next step as Pk+1. In the WAMI tracking
system, when observation zk is unavailable within ε for
some reason, the update step can be skipped and multiple
prediction steps are performed consecutively. In this case,
the Bayesian uncertainty ε may ‘explode’, and the search
range of observations is expanded. We will explain later this
property can be utilised to design a monitor to counter the
attack, and therefore should be considered when analysing
the robustness.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Threat Model of Adversarial Attack on Perception System
In Section II-C, a neural network based perception system
determines whether or not there is a vehicle at a location z.
Let x(z) ∈ Rd1×d2 be an image covering the location z, a
neural network function fN : Rd1×d2 → {0, 1} maps x(z)
into a Boolean value fN (x(z)) representing whether or not
a vehicle is present at location z. There are two types of
erroneous detection: (1) a wrong classification prediction of
the image x(z), and (2) a wrong positioning of a moving
object within x(z). We focus on the former since the WAMI
tracking system has a comprehensive mechanism to prevent
the occurrence of the latter.
The threat model of an adversary is depicted as in Figure 1.
Assuming that fN (x(z)) = 1, an adversary is to compute
another input x̃(z) with a certain payoff to have a different
classification, i.e., fN (x̃(z)) = 0. Without loss of generality,
the payoff is measured with the norm-distance from x̃(z) to
its original image x(z), or formally
||x̃(z)− x(z)||p (10)
To deviate from an input image x(z) to its adversarial
input x̃(z), a large body of adversarial example gener-
ation algorithms and adversarial test case generation al-
gorithms are available [7], [8]. Formal verification based
methods such as [9]–[11] can also be used. Given a neu-
ral network N and an input x, an adversarial algorithm
A produces an adversarial example A(N, x) such that
fN (A(N, x)) 6= fN (x). On the other hand, for test case gen-
eration, an algorithm A produces a set of test cases A(N, x),
among which the optimal adversarial test case is such that
arg minx̃∈A(N,x),fN (x̃)6=fN (x) ||x̃−x||p. We remark that, the
work in this paper is independent from particular adversarial
algorithms. We use in our experiments two algorithms:
• DeepFool [12], which finds an adversarial example x̃
by projecting x onto the nearest decision boundary.
• DeepConcolic [13], which generates test cases by apply-
ing combined symbolic and concrete execution, guided
by adapted MC/DC metrics for neural networks.
We denote by payoff (A,N, x), the payoff that an algo-
rithm A needs to compute an adversarial example from x and
N . Furthermore, we assume that the adversary can observe
the parameters of the Bayes filter, for example, Hk,Fk,
Qk,Rk of the Kalman filter.
B. {PO}2-Labelled Transition Systems
Let Prop be a set of atomic propositions. A payoff and
partially-ordered label transition system, or {PO}2-LTS, is a
tuple M = (Q, q0, kf , L, α, β), where Q is a set of states,
q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, kf ⊆ Q×Q is a transition relation,
L : Q→ 2Prop is a labelling function, α : Q×Q→ R+ is
a payoff function assigning every transition a non-negative
real number, and β : kf → kf is a partial order relation
between out-going transitions from the same state.
C. Reduction of WAMI Tracking to {PO}2-LTS
We model a neural network enabled state estimation
system as a {PO}2-LTS. A brief summary of some key
notations in this paper are in Table I. We let each pair
(sk,Pk) be a state, and use the transition relation kf to
model the transformation from a pair to another pair in
a Bayes filter. We have the initial state q0 by choosing a
detected vehicle (s0,P0) on the map. From a state qk−1 =
(sk−1,Pk−1) and a set Zk of candidate observations, we
have one transition (qk−1, qk) for each z ∈ Zk, where
qk = (sk,Pk) can be computed with Equations (3)-(5) by
having zk in Equation (6) as the new observation. For a
state qk = (sk,Pk), we write s(qk) to denote the estimate
sk, P(qk) to denote the covariance matrix Pk, and z(qk) to
denote the new observation that has been used to compute
s(qk) and P(qk) from its parent state qk−1.
Subsequently, for each transition (qk−1, qk), its associated
payoff α(qk−1, qk) is denoted by payoff (A,N, x(z(qk))),
i.e., the payoff that the adversary uses the algorithm A to
manipulate x(z(qk)) – the image covering the observation
z(qk) – into another image on which the neural network N
believes there exists no vehicle.
For two transitions (qk−1, q1k) and (qk−1, q
2
k) from the
same state qk−1, we say that they have a partial order rela-
tion, written as (qk−1, q1k) ≺ (qk−1, q2k), if making z(q2k) the
new observation requires the adversary to fool the network
N into misclassifying x(z(q1k)). For example, in WAMI
Notations Description
zk ∈ Zk observed location by WAMI tracking
x(z) an d1×d2 image covering location z
fN neural network function
payoff (A,N, x)
payoff for algorithm A computing
an adversarial example from x and N
qk = (sk,Pk)
a state at step k, consisting of
estimate and covariance matrix
s(qk), P(qk) and z(qk)
estimate of qk , covariance matrix of qk
and observed location for transition (qk−1, qk)
ρ a path of consecutive states ql...qu
TABLE I: A Summary of Notations Used
Fig. 2: Tree diagram of an unfolding {PO}2-LTS
tracking, according to Equation (6), the condition means that
||z(q2k)− z||p > ||z(q1k)− z||p, where z = Hks(qk−1) is the
predicted location.
Example 1. Figure 2 depicts a tree diagram for the un-
folding of a labelled transition system. The root node on
top represents the initial state q0. Each layer comprises all
possible states of qk = (sk,Pk) at step k of WAMI tracking,
with sk being one possible estimate, and Pk the covariance
matrix. Each transition connects a state qk−1 at step k−1 to
qk at step k. . . . , zk−1, zk, zk+1, zk+2, . . . are the observed
locations at each step by WAMI tracking.
Given a {PO}2-LTS M , we define a path ρ as a sequence
of consecutive states ql...qu, and z(ρ) as a sequence of
corresponding observed location zl...zu for 0 ≤ l < u, where
l and u are the starting and ending time under consideration,
respectively. We write ρk for the state qk, and z(ρk) for the
observed location z(qk) on the path ρ.
D. A Simple Monitor on Bayesian Uncertainty
Given the convergence of the KF (as explained in Sec-
tion II-D), we can easily design a system to monitor the
Bayesian uncertainty: whenever there is an increase of the
uncertainty range ε, an alarm is set to notify the potential
attack. To overcome this monitor, we require that a successful
attack should not present an increase on ε. To understand
when the increase may appear for the WAMI tracking sys-
tem, we recall the discussion in Section II-C that a tracking
associates the nearest observation z within the uncertainty
range ε at each step. When no observations are available in
the range, e.g., all the observations in Zk are attacked, only
Equation (3) is performed and Equation (4) is skipped. In this
case, the Bayesian uncertainty increases due to the noise Qk
and the transition matrix Fk.
E. Specification as Optimization
Verification determines whether a specification φ holds on
a given LTS M [14]. Usually, a logic language, such as CTL,
LTL, or PCTL, is used to formalize the specification φ. In
this paper, to suit our needs, we let the specification φ be a
constrained optimisation objective, and then the verification
is to determine whether, given M and φ, there is a solution
to the optimisation problem. If the answer is affirmative, an
optimal solution is returned.
We focus on the specification that expresses the robustness
of the system – given an adversary, whether or not the
state estimation system is able to function well with only
minor loss of localisation precision? – but remark that the
verification algorithm can be extended to work with other
specifications.
First, we consider the measure for the loss of localisation
precision. Let ρ be an original path that has not suffered
an attack. We define dist(ρ, ρ̃) as the distance between ρ
and the other path ρ̃, which is obtained after an attack, and
say that the system is robust to the attack if dist(ρ, ρ̃) <
θrobustness for a threshold θrobustness > 0. For the WAMI
tracking system, we define
dist(ρ, ρ̃) = (
u∑
k=l
||z(ρk)− z(ρ̃k)||p)/(u− l + 1) (11)
as the averaged norm distance between two given times l
and u. It is straightforward to see that, if we can find the
maximally allowed distance maxρ̃ dist(ρ, ρ̃) then we can
firmly conclude – through verification – whether or not the
system is robust on the path ρ, by comparing a given distance
d with maxρ̃ dist(ρ, ρ̃).
In addition to the satisfaction of the objective as above,
we require the best attack to not be easily detected by e.g.,
monitors. In this paper, we consider two monitors who look
after two quantities, as explained below. Firstly, we consider
a monitor Γ which looks after the Kalman filter’s state by
considering its convergence. Γ has the following definition:
Γ(ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k) =
{
1 ε(ρ̃k) ≤ ε(ρ̃k−1)
0 ε(ρ̃k) > ε(ρ̃k−1)
(12)
Basically, Γ continuously checks the value of uncertainty ε,
which is derived from covariance P. It is to capture the case
where the uncertainty increases, as required by Section III-D.
We consider the other simple monitor which looks after
the (mean) payoff in attacking the perception system and,
once the payoff is over a threshold θpayoff the attacker is








as the combined payoffs that are required to implement the
transition (ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k). Intuitively, all the payoffs of the transi-
tions (ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k), which are partially ordered by the envisaged
transition (ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k), are counted. In the WAMI tracking
system, this means that the attack results in misclassifications
of all the images x(z(ρ̃k)) with z(ρ̃

k) being closer to the
predicted location Fks(q̃k−1) than z(ρ̃k).







Γ(ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k) = u− l
u∑
k=l+1
ϕ(ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k) ≤ (u− l) · θpayoff
(14)
where dist(ρ̃, ρ) is the deviation from the original track
ρ to the adversarial track ρ̃,
∑u
k=l+1 Γ(ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k) is the




ϕ(ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k)/(u− l) (15)
is the mean payoff from time l to u. Finally, the verification
problem is to compute the above optimisation objective on
a given {PO}2-LTS M .
IV. AUTOMATED VERIFICATION
An attack on the WAMI system, as in Section III-A, adds
perturbations to the images containing vehicles in order to
fool the neural network into making a wrong detection. Then,
this wrong detection will be passed on to the KF-based
tracking system. For the KF, a detection is adopted as an
observation w.r.t. the Gnn, as explained in Section II-C. In
this section, we develop algorithms to find the maximally
deviated path, which will be compared with a given threshold
θrobustness to have the verification result.
A. Baseline Method
We consider a baseline method that does not take into
account the monitor on Bayesian uncertainty (Equation (11))
or the other monitor on attack payoff (Equation (13)); it
simply attacks the neural networks to make the currently
associated observation – the nearest one to the prediction –
unseen to the KF. This is the method used in [5].
B. Verification Algorithm based on Exhaustive Search
Our verification algorithm proceeds by exhaustively com-
puting over all possible attacked tracks. Since a final devi-
ation is not available until the end of a simulation, the tree
has to be fully expanded from the root to the leaf and all
the paths are explored. Breadth-first search (BFS) is used to
find the best solution.
The details are in Algorithm 1. We have several operation
functions on the tree diagram for the labelled transition
system. leaf returns all leaf nodes of the given root node.
parent associates a node to its parent node. path returns all
tree paths from the given root node to the leaf nodes.
Lines 2-15 present the procedure of constructing the tree
diagram. First, we set the root node ρl (Line 2), that is,
we will attack the system from the (l)-th state of the original
Algorithm 1: Verification Algorithm based on BFS
Input: LTS model M , n, l, u
Output: The most deviated path ρ̃M
1: calculate the original path ρ from k = 0 to k = n
2: set ρl as root node
3: for k from l to u−1 do
4: for each node ρ̃k in leaf(ρl) do
5: find potential observations Z ← neighbours(ρ̃k)
6: for each observed location z in Z do
7: ρ̃k+1 ← kf(ρ̃k, z)
8: calculate the attack payoff ϕ(ρ̃k, ρ̃k+1)
9: if Γ(ρ̃k, ρ̃k+1) 6= 1 then
10: break
11: end if




16: P ← path(ρl)
17: calculate the path ρ̃ in set P to k = n
18: ε =
∑u
k=l+1 ϕ(ρ̃k−1, ρ̃k)/(u− l)
19: ρ̃M ← arg maxρ̃∈P,ε(ρ̃)≤θpayoff dist(ρ, ρ̃)
20: return ρ̃M
path ρ and enumerate all possible adversarial tracks. At each
step k, function neighbours will list all observations near
the predicted location (Line 5). Then, each observation is
incorporated with current state ρk for the calculation of next
state ρk+1 (Line 7). To enable each transition (ρk, ρk+1), the
partial order relation is followed when attacking the system
and recording the payoff ϕ; also, the convergence property of
KF is checked (Line 8-11). If these constraints are satisfied,
the potential ρk+1 is accepted and added as the child node
of ρk. Once the tree is constructed, we continue simulating
the tracks to the end of time, k = n, (Lines 16-17). Finally,
all the paths are compared with the original one to select the
most deviated path, satisfying the payoff constraint (Lines
18-19).
C. Heuristic Algorithm based on Sub-optimal Greedy Search
Although the verification algorithm can find the optimal
solution, its computation is not polynomial time, and there-
fore cannot be executed in real-time. A heuristic function can
be designed to rank all possible children nodes to select the
most likely one. As shown in Algorithm 2, heuristic search
is based on the strategy of making the locally optimal choice
at each stage. Compared with the exhaustive exploration,
heuristic search can find the sub-optimal solution with sig-
nificantly less computational cost.
To design a heuristic search algorithm for the optimization
problem (14), we construct two KFs which run simulta-
neously for the vehicle tracking. One normal KF accepts
the original observations and outputs its states to guide the
selection of observations by the adversarial KF. The locally
optimal choice is to select the most distant observation of
Algorithm 2: Greedy Based Heuristic Search
Input: LTS model M , n, l, u
Output: The deviated path ρ̃
1: calculate the original path ρ from k = 0 to k = n
2: start from ρ̃l = ρl
3: for k from l to u−1 do
4: find potential observations Z ← neighbours(ρ̃k)
5: z(ρ̃k)← g(Z, z(ρk))
6: ρ̃k+1 ← kf(ρ̃k, z(ρ̃k))
7: calculate the payoff ε← ϕ(ρ̃k, ρ̃k+1)
8: if Γ(ρ̃k, ρ̃k+1) 6= 1 or ε > θpayoff then
9: remove z(ρ̃k) from Z
10: jump to Line 5
11: end if
12: end for
13: calculate the path ρ̃ to k = n
14: return ρ̃
the original one (Line 5). The heuristic function is
g(Z, z) = arg max
z̃∈Z
||z̃− z||2 (16)
where z and z̃ are the correct and adversarial observation of
tracked vehicle obtained in detection, respectively. Lines 7-
11 monitor the Bayesian uncertainty and the attack payoff. If
the current solution cannot bypass the monitor, the heuristic
algorithm will iterate to find the next most distant observation
until a feasible one.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We conduct a set of experiments to show the effectiveness
of our verification algorithm (Algorithm 1) and heuristic
search algorithm (Algorithm 2) in the WAMI tracking sys-
tem. We believe our approaches can be generalised to work
with other systems using both Bayes filter(s) and neural
networks.
A. Research Questions
Our evaluation experiments are guided by the following
three research questions.
RQ1 Does the awareness to the Bayesian uncertainty and the
input perturbation in our algorithms improve the quality
of the obtained solutions?
RQ2 Can our algorithms prove the robustness of the system?
RQ3 What are the pros and cons of the two algorithms?
B. Experimental Setup
We consider a number of original tracks with maximum
length of 20 steps (n = 19, k ∈ [0, 19]). An attack on the
system is conducted between time steps l and u, denoted
as Attack(l, u). The original track is colored in green in
both the high-resolution images (Figure 3–4) and the state
space unfolding (Figure 5). The attacked track is colored in
red. The white-color arrows in the high-resolution images
indicates the ground-truth direction of the vehicle.
(a) Baseline, εavg = 1.231, T = 70, dist = 42
(b) Heuristic/verification, εavg = 0.676, T = 73, dist = 189
Fig. 3: The comparison between the baseline and the
heuristic/verification in selected scene with configuration
Attack(5, 8)
Moreover, in all experiments, we record the following
measures for each attack: mean payoff, εavg , mean deviation,
dist, as defined in Section III-E, and runtime T (seconds).
The payoff threshold is set at θpayoff = 1 and the robustness
threshold is set at θrobustness = 100. The thresholds are
hyper-parameters and can also be user-defined. Here, we run
100 test scenes and set the mean values for the thresholds.
C. Returning Good Solutions within Constraints (RQ1)
In Section III-E, we set the the criteria for the adversary
to make the attack more realistic. From the adversary’s
perspective, constraints make sure the attack is not easily
detected by simple monitors. In this section, we discuss the
impact of these constraints by comparing the two algorithms
with the baseline method.
Figure 3 presents two plots displaying the change of
uncertainty ε over time, for baseline method and heuris-
tic/verification algorithm, respectively. In this test scene,
heuristic and verification algorithms output the same results.
Since the baseline method does not take into consideration
the KF’s convergence, there exists the situation that, in some
time step, no observations are available within the search
range – because the only possible observation is attacked –
and there is a significant fluctuation at step 8 in the plot.
For the impact of input perturbations, we can see that
the heuristic/verification algorithm has a much smaller εavg
– representing a lower mean perturbation cost – than the
baseline method. The runtime T is related to the attacking
strategy. The heuristic/verification algorithm may need to
attack multiple images at each time step to make sure that the
remotest observation is taken as the observation. Therefore,
the generation of perturbations to attack neural networks may
take slightly more time than the baseline method. Overall,
the heuristic/verification algorithm can find better attacking
solution with smaller distance to the original track than
the baseline method, and at the same time it satisfies the
constraints from WAMI monitors.
D. Proof of Robustness Against the Attack (RQ2)
In addition to the ability of finding counterexamples to
the robustness property, one may be interested in whether or
not our approach can prove, with guarantee, that a system
is robust. Figure 4 provides an example. We choose the
test scene in Figure 4b, where the red numbers represent
the detected moving vehicles. We apply heuristic search and
verification algorithms on the track of vehicle No.0, which is
shown in Figure 4a. In this case, the WAMI system shows the
robustness against the attack. Fundamentally, there are few
other vehicles around the tracking car and, at each attack
step, only one observation is available in the search range,
shown in Figure 4c. Thus, to build the tree diagram for this
problem, there is only one path to be traversed and therefore
no adversarial path is possible.
While the above seems to be an extreme case, it actually
represents a typical class of systems that tend to be more
robust than others, i.e., systems for the test scenes with
few external disturbances. The external disturbance comes
from the observations of the surrounding vehicles, providing
the wrong measurements when KF updates. We remark
that this proof can be generalised to exercise the system’s
robustness for more complicated environments, consisting of
an extensive number of vehicles.
(a) Output (b) Detected moving vehicles
(c) Transition of path for track in (a)
Fig. 4: Failure in finding an attacked path
E. Pros and Cons of the Two Algorithms (RQ3)
We compare the performance of the two algorithms –
verification and heuristic – by choosing the same tracking
start point and apply the algorithms to the same time in-
terval. The detailed running results are presented in Figure
5 and Table II. As depicted in Figure 5c, the verification
method enumerates all possible tracks and selects the most
deviated one, colored red. This is the optimal solution to the
optimization problem. While the heuristic search method can
find a sub-optimal track, colored blue.
(a) Heuristic search (b) Verification
(c) Enumeration of all possible Tracks
Fig. 5: Heuristic search and verification Attack(5, 8) on a
selected scene. Tree graph exhibits all possible tracks, where
green is the original track, blue is the attacked track found
by heuristic search, and red is the attacked track found by
verification. The labels on the nodes represent “(time step)-
(ID of associated detection)”.
TABLE II: Tracks Generated by Different Algorithms.
Original Track
t 5 6 7 8
...
19
ID 40 46 43 36 11
dist 0 0 0 0 0
Adv. Track under
heuristic search
t 5 6 7 8
...
19
ID 40 48 47 48 58
dist 0 3.4 10.1 19.7 170.3
Adv. Track under
verification
t 5 6 7 8
...
19
ID 40 43 37 28 7
dist 0 0.4 5.1 13.7 193.3
The data in Table II more precisely indicates the transition
policy of the two algorithms. During the time interval (5, 8),
the heuristic search guides the tracking to the locally optimal
waypoint, which has larger dist values than the verification
method. However, for the long term (over 20 time steps),
verification is always able to determine the optimal solution.
We also evaluate the two algorithms statistically by sam-
pling 100 test scenes and calculate the average performance.
The results can be found in Table III. Since we incorporate
the same adversarial attack algorithm, both verification and
heuristic search algorithms have similar average perturbation
cost εavg . However, for the runtime cost T , verification is
significantly more time-consuming than the heuristic search.
TABLE III: Statistical Comparison between the Verification
and Heuristic Search Algorithms
Algorithm εavg T dist
Probability of
Finding Best Adv. Track
heuristic search 0.63 78 93 80%
verification 0.65 3465 117 100%
Most test scenes have a high concentration of vehicles,
i.e., there are large amount of candidate observations. The
runtime cost of verification is proportional to the candi-
date observations. Therefore, while verification can find the
complete results, it is not suitable for real-time analysis.
In contrast, heuristic search, although unable to guarantee
the optimal solution, is efficient in runtime. Actually, in our
experiments, for 80% of the cases we studied, the heuristic
search algorithm can find the optimal solution.
In terms of the safety risks of the WAMI tracking system,
we noticed that, the potential risk from the learning compo-
nents is non-trivial. For example, we often see e.g., a 3-step
attack lead to a significantly deviated tracking – a deviation
distance of 117 from the original track on average. This
illustrates the lack of robustness within the state estimation
system we have verified.
VI. RELATED WORK
We reviewed research on the safety analysis of learning
enabled autonomous systems. Indeed, ML techniques have
been confirmed to have potential safety risks [8]. Currently,
most safety analysis work is on the verification and validation
of ML components. Please refer to [15] for a recent survey
on the progress of this area.
Research is sparse at the system level, and none on state
estimation systems. In [16], a compositional framework is
developed for the falsification of temporal logic properties of
cyber physical systems with ML components. Alternatively,
a simulation based approach [17] is suggested to verify
the barrier certificates – representing safety invariants – of
autonomous driving systems with an SMT solver. In both
papers, the interaction – or synchronisation – between ML
and other components is through a shared value, which is
drastically different with neural network enabled state esti-
mation, where the synchronisation is closer to the message-
passing regime. Moreover, the erroneous behaviours and the
specifications of this paper are different from those of [16],
[17]. These differences suggest that the existing approaches
cannot be extended to work with our problem.
Moreover, there is some early research on the robustness
of KF by false information injection [18], where the false
information is modelled as Gaussian noise, differing from
our consideration of adversarial attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a practical verification ap-
proach for an in-depth investigation into the safety risks
of a typical class of learning-enabled systems in robotics.
Extensive experiments are conducted on a real-world system
– WAMI tracking – which tracks ground vehicles through
high-resolution imagery inputs. The results show that our
approach can prove the safety of the system against attacks
to the neural network components; if it is safe; and returns
the best counterexample otherwise.
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